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Abstract 
The conventional wisdom holds that ‘once a terrorist always a terrorist’. This paper 
will examine, on the contrary, how very different groups and individuals have 
abandoned political violence. The paper will provide a review of the literature on 
terrorism, particularly since 9/11 and on disengagement more specifically. 
Subsequently the paper will assess disengagement in Italy and South-East Asia in two 
ways: by looking both at the factors leading to disengagement reported by the former 
‘terrorists’ and at the policies implemented by different states to foster 
disengagement. The author aims to show that, contrary to much of the literature on 
‘new terrorism’, though violent groups, and target states differ vastly similar 
conclusions can be drawn on why disengagement occurs and how it can be fostered. 
Finally concluding remarks will be made along with policy recommendations in 
particular on the issue of disengaging and reintegrating returning foreign fighters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Documento dei 51: one of the first documents of collective disengagement 
from ‘terrorism’ in Italy. Available online via ilmanifesto.info/archivio 
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Introduction 
The vast increase in acts of terror in the last twenty years has been matched by 
a similar rise in academic work on the subject. Particularly since 9/11 there has been a 
substantial increase in publications on the subject of ‘terrorism’. In 2006 one new 
book on terrorism was published every 6 hours (Silke 2008, p. 28), and with the rise 
of ISIL, Jemaah Islamiyah and the more recent attacks in Beirut, Anakra, Paris and 
Brussels the relevance of the subject is unlikely to decrease. In the aftermath of acts 
of terror, both in 2001 and more recently the rhetoric of politicians has seemed to be 
one of a hard militaristic approach, aimed at fighting ‘until every terrorist group of 
global reach has been found, stopped and defeated (Bush 2001)’.  
The discourse in these times is one of dehumanization of the enemy and its ‘evil 
ideology’, calling for nations to be ‘merciless against the barbarians [of Daesh]’ 
(Hollande 2015). How can further polarization and conflict be avoided? While 
security forces are essential to neutralize imminent threats, and contrasting further 
radicalization may prevent the materialization of future ‘terrorists’ there also a need 
for policies aimed at fostering disengagement and defection of current violent non 
state actors. 
 
  
 
 
Disengagement is ‘a process through which a member of a terror group, radical 
movement, gang, or cult chooses to cease participation in acts of violence’ (Hwang 
2015, p. 2) it is therefore the process through which a member of a violent group may 
Fig. 1: GTD (2015) The chart shows the dramatic increase in acts of terror 
globally since the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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either move to a non-violent role within the organization or abandon it. It differs from 
deradicalization insofar as the former indicates a behavioral change while the latter 
‘denotes a change in values and attitudes’ (ibid). An individual can be deradicalized 
but still engaged in violent political activity for various reasons, in other words: ‘not 
all individuals who engage in terrorism are radical and not all individuals who 
disengage are ‘deradicalized’ upon their departure’ (Altier et al. 2014, p. 648).  
Most research within ‘terrorism studies’ has been focused on why people engage in 
political violence, leaving the study of disengagement ‘conceptually and theoretically 
underdeveloped’ (ibid, p. 647). However, researching and fostering disengagement 
may have multiple positive outcomes.  
In the short term disengaged individuals may provide valuable information for 
counter-terrorism operations. In the medium term negotiating with individual 
members can lead to fear of infiltrators which undermines in group cohesion, by 
breeding ‘mistrust and resentment among members’ (Abrahms 2008, p. 105). 
Undermining internal cohesion is a key element of a comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy. In the long term seeing individuals that have renounced the armed struggle 
and cooperated with the justice system may be an incentive and example for others to 
abandon violent non-state organizations; furthermore the example of these individuals 
may help prevent the radicalization of others.  
 
Theoretical Framework & Hypothesis 
Modern ‘terrorism’ can be said to have originated with what Rapoport has 
called the ‘Anarchist wave’ between the 19th and 20th century. The American scholar 
has theorized that modern violent non-state actors can be divided into four temporally 
and ideologically different ‘waves’ (2006). The ‘Anti-colonial wave’ followed the 
Anarchist one as many groups in territories under colonial rule fought for self 
determination and independence. This wave was followed by the ‘New Left’ wave, in 
which ‘terrorist’ groups, mostly in Europe carried out attacks with the purpose of 
initiating a Marxist-Leninist revolution. The Italian groups Brigate Rosse (BR) and 
Prima Linea (PL) were a part of this wave. The fourth ‘Religious wave’ overlaps with 
the third one and continues to the present day and is composed mostly of Islamist 
groups, such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI).  
Recently many scholars have noted that this fourth wave constitutes a new kind of 
‘terrorism’. Groups of this ‘New Terrorism’ are said to be less rational and more 
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lethal than previous waves. The novel features of this wave will be outlined in the 
literature review. Regarding this wave as a new phenomenon implies that historical 
antecedents are deemed irrelevant (Laqueur 2001, p. 5) and are therefore 
understudied.  
This paper will attempt to assess the hypothesis that Islamic ‘terrorism’ is new and 
that lessons from the past are irrelevant. In particular the paper will attempt to assess 
if there are similarities in the process of disengagement, the factors reported as 
conducive to it, and state policies aimed at fostering it. To do so the paper will 
examine two very different cases of the third and fourth wave.  
Firstly the paper will assess disengagement from Italian domestic left wing 
organizations Brigate Rosse (BR), and Prima Linea (PL) as well as the success of the 
Italian state’s policies aimed at fostering disengagement and defection. Secondly 
disengagement from transnational Islamic group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) will be 
analyzed as well as the policies implemented by Singapore and Indonesia to foster it. 
Finally, the two cases will be compared to assess similarities.  
It may seem counterintuitive to assess disengagement from a group like JI, which is 
still active today, however it is important to keep I mind that this paper will assess 
disengagement and the policies aimed at fostering it on an individual level, and not on 
a group level. Individual disengagement from the group or political violence will be 
assessed, not the group’s abandonment of violent means. Furthermore, while JI does 
remain active a vast part of its membership, even many leaders, have either been 
killed, imprisoned or disengaged, leaving the group forced to scale back activities 
considerably (Hwang 2015, p. 281). 
 
Sources & Methodology 
 The cases have been chosen both for their difference and because their 
selection addresses many of the critiques mentioned in the literature review. The 
methodological approach will be one of a least similar case study. In this design ‘the 
researcher selects cases that are dissimilar in all but one independent variable but that 
share the same dependent variable’ (Bennett, Elman 2007, p. 175). 
 The Italian and South-East Asian case differ in many variables. Firstly they occupy 
very different historical moments and geographical settings, the Red Brigades (BR), 
Prima Linea (PL) and the Italian state existed in the context of the cold war in Europe 
and the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism, and are a part of 
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what Rapoport describes as the third or ‘New Left’ wave of terror (2006); while JI 
operates in South-East Asia in the context of what Barber has described as Jihad vs 
Mcworld (1995), a religious resistance to globalization and a group of the fourth 
religious wave (2006);). By comparing a group of the third wave to one contemporary 
one the paper aims to show that lessons can be learnt from historical antecedents 
which apply to what is being described as ‘new terrorism’, thus addressing the 
critiques of acontextuality and ahistoricity and undermining the ‘New Terrorism 
paradigm’.  
Secondly, the groups differ in their scope of action: the BR and PL were strictly 
national organizations, while JI is transnational, as it has cells in Thailand, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. The reason that a comparison is made between 
the Italian state on one hand and multiple South-East Asian states on the other, lies in 
this transnational element; because JI is a transnational group, unlike the BR or PL, 
the group and state responses to it also need to be assessed transnationally. 
Thirdly, the attacks and targets of these two groups also differ vastly. The BR focused 
mainly on kidnappings, targeted assassinations and ‘kneecapping’, while JI has 
carried out large-scale bombings on western and symbolic economic targets, such as 
the Marriot Hotel and the Jakarta Stock Exchange. The paper aims to show that 
though the groups are different in almost everything but their designation as 
‘terrorists’, an approach aimed at fostering disengagement, social reintegration and 
individual concessions can be a crucial part of a comprehensive counter-terrorism 
strategy in both cases, even when dealing with alleged ‘new terrorists’. The table 
below outlines the differences and the common variable. 
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The critique of lack of primary research (Jackson, 2005, pp. 66) in terrorism studies 
will be tackled by assessing two cases in which interviews with former terrorists are 
available. In the Italian case as there is an ‘extraordinary number of autobiographies 
published by the former terrorists’ (Cento Bull & Cooke 2013, p. xiii), here sources in 
Italian may also be consulted by the mother tongue author. Storie di Lotta Armata 
(Catanzaro & Manconi 1995) and Satta’s history of the Anni di Piombo (2016) were 
only available in Italian and were acquired in Italy. For the South-East Asian case the 
interviews conducted by J. Chernov Hwang (2015) with 50 jihadis will be essential, 
as well as work on disengagement in the region by Abuza (2009). Initiatives like the 
Religious Rehabilitation Group1 in Singapore will also be useful to assess the 
effectiveness of disengagement programs in the region. The case of JI presents fewer 
resources than the Italian one, as the group’s activity is more recent.  
In interviews of this type scholars have identified certain ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, 
which increase the likelihood of disengagement (ibid.). The former identify aspects 
which might lead an individual away from the organization and range form 
disillusionment with leaders or tactics to loss of faith in the ideology to adaptation to 
clandestine lifestyle. The latter outline elements which may ‘pull’ individuals back 
closer to civil society, such as the will to create a family, financial or judiciary 
incentives, employment or educational opportunities.  
From a methodological standpoint measuring disengagement is made difficult by the 
secretive nature of ‘terrorist’ organizations, which results in a difficulty in obtaining a 
representative sample (Altier et al. 2014, p. 648). This paper will assess if 
disengagement is similar in both cases in two ways. The essay will ascertain if the 
reasons reported for disengagement are similar, and if the policies aimed at 
incentivizing were also alike. By doing so the author hopes to show that Islamic 
terrorism is not fundamentally different from its predecessors and therefore that 
lessons can be learnt from past experiences. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Link: http://rrg.sg/ 
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Literature Review 
The field of terrorism studies has grown drastically in the last 25 years; along 
with its growth, the field has drawn much criticism. From an ontological perspective, 
the field has yet to develop one commonly accepted definition of ‘terrorism’, one 
study in fact found 109 different definitions (Schmidt & Jongman, 1988. pp. 5). 
 From an epistemological perspective the field has been criticized for inadequacy in 
primary research (Jackson, 2005, pp. 66) and for having a pro-state bias involving 
moral condemnation of the ‘terrorists’ (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996, pp. 149-150), and 
for being limited to addressing government agendas (Silke 2004, p. 58).  
This moral condemnation often involves an ‘othering’ and dehumanization of the 
enemy and hinders understanding of how and why individuals commit acts of terror, 
as well as of why and how individuals might leave organizations which adopt 
‘terrorism’ as a tool. Throughout the paper the author will attempt to avoid referring 
to actors as ‘terrorists’ and only do so in brackets, and speak instead of armed non-
state actors and acts of terror. 
 The field has also been criticized for ahistoricity and acontextuality (Jackson et al. 
2007, pp. 5). Violent Islamic fundamentalism has been described as a 'new type of 
terrorism [that] threatens the world' (Sageman 2004, pp. Vii). Hoffman, a leading 
scholar in the field wrote that, on 9/11, Bin Laden 'wiped the slate clean of 
conventional wisdom on terrorism' (2004, pp. Xviii). ‘New Terrorism’ is described as 
novel for a variety of factors. The actors are said to be religiously inspired by 
Wahhabi-Salafism, as well as by notions of martyrdom inherent in Islam (Atran, 
2006) and by eternal sexual reward in paradise (Jurgensmeyer, 2000, 201). These 
actors are also said to not have limits on their use of violence (Simon & Benjamin 
2000, p.59) (Martin 2010, p. 251) and transcendental aims (Fettweis 2009, p. 283).  
In contrast, nationalist violent non-state actors are said to be constrained in their use 
of violence by public support (Fettweis 2009, p. 281). The implication here is that 
‘new terrorists’ are not rational and therefore any negotiation or concession would be 
useless, the only solution being total military victory (ibid, p. 283). Scholars have 
concluded that ‘Terrorists kill and accept death for a cause with which no 
accommodation is possible, political Islam’ (Frum & Perle 2003, p.34). The ‘New 
Terrorism’ paradigm also implies that since current ‘terrorists’ are fundamentally 
different from their predecessors the lessons from these examples are not studied 
(Duyvesteyn & Malkki 2012), as they are deemed irrelevant.  
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Recently the ‘new terrorism’ paradigm has been criticized heavily. Pape (2005) and 
Duyvesteyn (2004, p. 446) hold that the goals for ‘New Terrorists’ are more territorial 
and less transcendental than previously thought (2005), therefore have more in 
common with earlier examples. Spencer and Duyvesteyn have noted that the 
organization of groups in networks or cells is also not new (2011; 2004, p. 444).  
In recent years, while an increase in literature on radicalization and deradicalization 
has been seen in the field (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009, p. 1) there has been little focus on 
how and why people leave ‘terrorist’ organizations (Hwang 2015, p.2). As noted in 
the introduction, disengagement refers to a change in behavior, an abandonment of 
political violence, a process which might occur separately from deradicalization, a 
change in thought (Reinares 2011, p. 780).  
While it is often assumed that individuals need to be deradicalized in order to 
disengage insights from psychology have shown that attitude and behavior rarely 
correlate (Horgan & Altier 2012, p. 88). However some authors have noted that these 
terms have been used ambiguously and inconsistently in the literature (Altier, 
Thoroughgood & Horgan 2014, p. 647). 
The lack of research into disengagement contrasts with the increasing availability of 
former ‘terrorists’ to speak to researchers, particularly in European countries such as 
Italy, Spain and Northern Ireland (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009, p. 15). In addition many of 
these individuals have written autobiographies, which can provide first hand accounts 
on the process of individual disengagement. In assessing first hand accounts of former 
violent non-state actors it is important to keep in mind their limitations: the authors 
may attempt to sensationalize events, justify the behavior of the group or their own 
(Cordes 1987). 
Even with these difficulties disengagement factors seem consistent throughout 
different organizations. Bjørgo & Horgan write that: ‘many of the factors involved in 
leaving ‘terrorist’ organizations appear similar in spite of great differences in 
ideological content’ (2009, p. 5). Furthermore, it has been noted that similar factors 
leading to disengagement have been reported by individuals leaving new religious 
movements (Altier, Thoroughgood & Horgan 2014, p. 648) and by those leaving 
criminal youth gangs as well as far right organizations (Bjørgo & Horgan 2009, p. 5).  
Disengagement literature has adopted an interdisciplinary approach, using theories 
and models from various areas of study. Scholars have appropriated from psychology 
Rusbult’s investment model (1983) to better understand when and why individuals 
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leave underground organizations (Altier, Thoroughgood & Horgan 2014, p. 648). To 
understand how this process occurs insights from sociology have proven fruitful, such 
as Ebaugh’s theory of voluntary role exit (1988). Furthermore studies on leaving new 
religious movements (Bromley 2006) (Wright 1983) and criminal gangs (Decker & 
Lauritsen 1996) (Greene & Pravis 2007) have proven insightful, as they demand that 
their members ‘break all ties with their family and friends and leave the conventional 
world behind’ (Bovenkerk, 2011: 264). This break with non-group members also 
makes leaving these organizations difficult in a very similar way (Altier, 
Thoroughgood & Horgan 2014, p. 652). 
Insights from the fields mentioned above have helped enrich the literature on 
individual and collective disengagement form ‘terrorist’ organizations. While it has 
been noted that the way in which ‘terrorist’ campaigns decline is has been 
‘insufficiently studied’ (Cronin 2009, p. 49) we do find a body of literature both in 
general and on specific case studies. On disengagement in general, individual and 
collective, the literature is informed by works by Horgan (2003; 2006), Bjørgo & 
Horgan (2009), Crenshaw (1991) Some scholars have hypothesized a link between 
the causes of ‘terrorism’ and the causes of its demise (Crenshaw 1991, p. 73) (Ross & 
Gurr 1989, p. 407-8) while others hold that this link is an oversimplification (Cronin 
2009, p. 51). 
Works on disengagement from specific ‘terrorist’ groups have focused on both 
Europe and Islamic countries. In Europe, disengaged combatants from the BR, ETA, 
and the IRA have proven to be useful sources to study the process of abandonment of 
the armed struggle. On the Irish case we find studies by Clubb (2014), and Ferguson 
& Burgess (2015) among others. In Italy disengagement from violent groups has been 
studied by della Porta (2009; 1992), Jamieson (1990) and Cento Bull & Cooke 
(2013); similarly multiple studies on abandonment of ETA can be found in the 
literature (Reinares 2011), (Alonso 2011). These groups and their processes of 
disengagement have also been studied comparatively (Alonso 2004; 2009), (Muro 
2010), (Cento Bull & Cooke 2013, pp: 208-223).  
Studies of disengagement from more recent Islamic groups have focused on Egypt 
(Gunaratna 2009),(Rashwan 2009), Yemen (Boucek, Beg & Horgan 2009) and Saudi 
Arabia (Buocek 2008; 2009). While the programs in these countries have been studied 
comparatively we find no extensive comparison of disengagement processes and 
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programs between European left-wing groups and Islamist ones. This paper will 
attempt to address this gap in the literature. 
 
Italy 
After World War II Italy saw a vast array of armed groups surfacing with very 
diverse demands. The first armed groups in the ‘fifties and ‘sixties were separatists in 
Südtirol and Sardinia, while in the ‘seventies and ‘eighties we see the birth and 
decline of political violence from both the far left and far right. Acts of terror aimed at 
gaining political concessions continued in the ‘ninties by the mafia association Cosa 
Nostra. This chapter will focus on disengagement from the two main groups of the 
‘New-Left wave’, the Brigate Rosse (BR) and Prima Linea (PL). Firstly the policies 
adopted by the Italian state to foster disengagement will be assessed, secondly, the 
factors reported by former ‘terrorists’ as conducive to disengagement will be 
analyzed. 
The first groups of this wave were born between 1969 and 1970 such as the Banda 22 
Ottobre and the Gruppi Armati Proletari. In 1970 the Brigate Rosse (BR) were also 
created; they carried out their first attack in that year, the burning of a car of a 
Milanese businessman, while the first kidnapping took place in 1972, while the first 
victims fell in 1974 (Cento Bull & Cooke 2003, p. 6). In this year the ‘capi storici’ 
(historical leaders) of the BR were also arrested and in 1976 Prima Linea (PL) was 
born, the second largest armed group in Italy after the BR in terms of victims and acts 
of violence perpetrated. The last act of political violence of the Anni di Piombo is 
considered to be the assassination of Democrazia Cristiana (DC) senator Roberto 
Ruffilli in 1988. Between 1969 and 1987 ‘terrorism’ in Italy caused 491 deaths and 
over 1000 injuries (Fumian 2010, p. XV).  
At the beginning of this wave, the Italian state did not have any laws specifically 
targeted at acts of terror and their perpetrators. The political violence of those years at 
first lead to the passing of various repressive legislative measures: in 1975 the Legge 
Reale increased police powers by allowing the use of firearms in more situations and 
by extending the time for which an individual could be held without charge (Cento 
Bull & Cooke 2003, p. 32). Specific anti-terrorism laws were passed after the Moro 
Kidnapping in 1978 and in 1980, the latter known as the Cossiga law, which called 
for more severe punishment for crimes related to ‘terrorism’ (ibid, p.33). The Italian 
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state had at first adopted a ‘hard line’ approach of increasing sentences and police 
powers.  
The Cossiga law however marks the beginning of a more comprehensive, softer 
approach, by introducing reductions in sentences for those who ‘dissociated 
themselves…and took measures to prevent criminal activity form having further 
consequences’ (ibid). This was the first step towards a ‘soft approach’ continued 
through the Legge 304 of 1982 which further specified the different incentives, in the 
forms of sentence reductions, to those who provided useful information to authorities 
and for those who dissociated themselves from the armed struggle and confessed their 
crimes. 1982 also saw the publication of the Documento dei 51 deemed by some to be 
‘the first document of political disengagement in Italy’ (Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, 
p. 281).  
The document outlined a third position between those willing to continue the armed 
struggle and the pentiti, the dissociati, i.e. those who abandoned the armed struggle 
but were not willing to provide useful information to the authorities. They requested 
‘aree omogenee’ (homogenous areas) where disengaged ‘terrorists’ could obtain 
better prison conditions and safety from any retaliation by former comrades. 
Homogenous areas were created in various prisons with the aim to ‘favour and 
develop from within processes of overcoming the experiences of terrorism’ and 
recuperate those who ‘demonstrated the willingness to reenter the system and accept 
its laws’(Amato in Satta 2016, p. 645). A further step was taken with Legge 34 of 
1987 with measures in favour of those who disengage and abandon the armed struggle 
but do not provide information to authorities.  
Seminal scholars on the subject have noted that laws on pentitismo and 
disengagement have made the defeat of ‘terrorism’ easier by ‘breaking the associative 
pact’, i.e. undermining internal cohesion.(della Porta 2009, p. 69-70). This view is 
echoed by former ‘terrorists’ such as BR founder Prospero Gallinari: ‘many friends 
disappeared overnight, headed for the homogeneous areas put at their disposal by the 
Ministry to foster defections. This situation quickly lead to… internal contradictions’ 
(Gallinari 2006, p. 279). At the end of the armed struggle 389 people had benefited 
from laws on pentitismo and dissociazione: 78 grandi pentiti, 134 pentiti and 178 
dissociati (della Porta 2009, p. 70). 
The aree omogenee were instrumental in fostering disengagement not only with 
reduced sentences but also through increased prospects of societal reintegration. 
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Prison reform in Italy ‘created the preconditions for reintegrating former terrorists 
into society, through professional training…and permission to work outside prison’ 
(della Porta 1992, p. 167). Mario Moretti, one of the founders of the BR currently 
serving six life sentences, is one of the people who has taken advantage of these 
permits. More recently he has founded various co-ops aimed at giving opportunities to 
work to former ‘terrorists’ and detainees in general (Ordinanza 11/11/97; Tribunale di 
Milano, p. 440). While this initiative was not taken by the state Moretti’s Cooperativa 
Spes is partly funded by the region of Lombardia (Zurlo 2006).  
Moretti’s initiative is of interest because it presents us with a former ‘terrorist’ 
involved personally in socio-economical reintegration of former combatants, with 
help from the state. Reintegration is crucial as a lack of opportunities upon release 
may lead an individual to rejoining the armed struggle. The next section will use 
interviews from various sources to see what factors, according to the ‘terrorists’ have 
lead to disengagement and the end of the armed struggle in Italy. Sources in both 
Italian and English will be consulted. 
While ‘soft policies’ such as the homogenous areas and reductions in prison sentences 
are considered important counter-terrorism elements for fostering disengagement the 
Moro Kidnapping in 1978 and assassination of communist pentito Guido Rossa are 
believed to be important acts carried out by the BR which had the unintended 
consequence of fostering disengagement by undermining the cohesion of groups on 
the far left, both by scholars (Jamieson 1990, p. 12) (Sidoni & Zanetov 2003, p. 525) 
(Satta 2016, p. 656; 671) and by former terrorists themselves. Disillusionment with 
tactics connected to an escalation of violence, or perceived unjust violence seems to 
be the factor most reported for disengagement.  
Many of the former ‘terrorists’ interviewed have cited the Moro kidnapping and the 
Rossa assassination as reasons for disengagement. This escalation of violence brought 
about a disillusionment with leaders and tactics in many. Morucci, an ex BR member 
involved in the Moro kidnapping holds that his crisis began with the killing of Aldo 
Moro and subsequently of the worker and trade unionist Guido Rossa’ (della Porta 
2009, p.73). This view is echoed by Piero, a former member of Autonomia Operaia 
who speaks of ‘aversion towards the brigatista project’(Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, 
p.266). A similar event causes many members of PL to disengage: the assassination of 
the reformist judge Alessandrini which ‘causes lacerations in PL and within the armed 
struggle (Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, p. 313). Claudia, a former PL member reports 
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beginning to question the armed struggle after this assassination (ibid). In both cases 
interviewees report disillusionment with tactics, specifically the escalation of 
violence. Disillusionment due to escalation of violence is a factor cited by other 
interviewees such as Paolo Lapponi, (Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, p. 203) Raffaele 
(ibid, p. 400, 406 ), Marco (ibid, p. 334).  
Former Italian ‘terrorists’ also frequently cite cost-benefit analyses as a reason for 
disengagement, particularly in reference to the inevitability of defeat. Paolo Lapponi 
speaks of the fear that ‘it would end up like in Germany..they would have arrested a 
lot of people’ (Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, p. 206) and also of the ‘social and 
historical uselessness of a certain armed attitude’ (ibid, p. 212). Claudia also speaks of 
‘actions’ carried out not rewarding the armed struggle in general terms (ibid, p.315).  
Raffaele also speaks of in terms of costs and benefits but in relation to the state’s 
counter-terrorism more than the armed struggle, he reports difficulty in reorganizing 
activities after intensification of state counter-terrorism efforts and turns pentito as he 
sees the cost of doing so as less than the benefit of avoiding a life sentence (ibid, p. 
404). Della Porta echoes that ‘in many accounts by activists, departure from terrorism 
is linked to a perception of inefficiency of the armed struggle’ (2009, p. 73). 
The state was also effective in fostering disengagement, as previously stated through 
its soft policies, such as the creation of aree omogenee (ibid, p. 71), general 
improvement in prison conditions, and laws which guaranteed reductions in sentences 
for those who repented or disengaged from the armed struggle (ibid, p. 70). Cento 
Bull & Cooke also write that ‘the replacement of harsh prison treatment with 
reformist measures acted as a catalyst for spurring a process of self reflection and 
moral change’ (2013, p. 89). Ex BR member Franco Bonisoli also cites this change 
from a humiliating to a better prison condition as a factor for disengagement (ibid, p. 
86), while Cavallina, former member of Proletari Armati per il Comunismo, has 
stated that before these ‘soft policies’ were put in place the prison was a 
‘manufacturer of terrorism’ and that dissociation was made easier by more humane 
conditions (ibid, p. 90).  
Many former ‘terrorists’ have made the argument that more humane prison conditions 
‘facilitated the move towards dissociation’ (ibid, p. 74). One PL detainee reported that 
more humane conditions accelerated his disengagement (ibid, p. 78); this view is 
echoed by former BR ‘terrorist’ Alfredo Buonavita who speaks of positive treatment 
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in an instance of request of transferal to an other prison (Catanzaro & Manconi 1995, 
p. 155). 
Furthermore, interviewees, have often reported changes in personal priorities and 
relationships as reasons to disengage. Buonavita reports altercations with his partner 
as a ‘decisive factor’ to disengage (ibid, p. 145) as well as the lack of personal 
relationships in general in the BR (ibid, p. 115). Baglioni, an ex member of Lotta 
Continua, also cites new relationships as a reason to disengage (ibid, p. 68), as does 
Raffaele (ibid, p. 403). One PL member has cited her desire for motherhood in her 
decision to abandon the armed struggle (Cento Bull & Cooke 2013, p. 80) while 
Bignami, one of the leaders of PL, interviewed by Cento Bull & Cooke stated that the 
will to rebuild personal lives and start a family was crucial in bringing about the 
collective disengagement of PL (2013, p. 75). 
A further element of interest in studying the Italian case is the role of the Catholic 
Church in fostering disengagement and in bringing about an improvement in 
detention conditions. Bignami has stated that ‘chaplains and nuns in the prisons 
established close contacts with the terrorists and helped promote a process of personal 
reflection’ (ibid, p. 75). PL acknowledged the role of the church as an impartial 
intermediary between the state and the ‘terrorists’ when it surrendered its weapons to 
Cardinal Martini in 1984 (ibid, p. 65); other ex PL members have also independently 
acknowledged the role of the Church in fostering disengagement (ibid, p. 79; 80). 
Bonisoli, member of the BR, also acknowledged the ‘fundamental’ role of the Church 
as interlocutor (ibid, p. 87). The role of the church in this context is particularly 
relevant to this study as it shows how religious actors can be useful in fostering 
disengagement even if the ‘terrorists’ are not religiously oriented, as they can promote 
the process of personal reflection Bignami and others have spoken about and act as 
intermediaries between the ‘terrorists’ and the state.  
Support for violent left wing organizations, such as the BR, decreased drastically after 
the Moro and Rossa assassinations, though a process of disengagement had started 
long before then. Most interviewees reported disillusionment with leaders and tactics 
as a factor, often in connection to an escalation of violence, such as the Moro, Rossa 
and Alessandrini assassinations. Cost-benefit analyses are also cited frequently; 
interviewees have spoken of the inevitability of defeat and the end of a certain time 
when the armed struggle seemed appropriate. Another factor reported consistently 
was a change in personal priorities and relationships, i.e. the desire to start a family 
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and rebuild a non-clandestine personal life. Humane treatment and improvement of 
prison conditions have often been claimed both by scholars and ex combatants to have 
played a crucial role in fostering disengagement. The creation of aree omogenee, safe 
areas for disengaged detainees, along with laws on pentitismo and dissociazione as 
well as professional training, have been regarded as successful tools adopted by the 
Italian state to foster disengagement, undermine internal cohesion of armed groups, 
and bring an end to the armed struggle. The role of clerics in bringing public attention 
to the conditions inmates lived in and in promoting, through dialogue with the 
‘terrorists’, a process of personal reflection conducive to disengagement is also of 
interest, as it demonstrates religious figures can be useful regardless of the ideological 
background of the ‘terrorists’.  
There is no agreement among scholars on what caused the end of ‘terrorism’ in Italy, 
however according to both former ‘terrorists’ and scholars, the laws passed by the 
Italian state have made the defeat of armed groups easier, both by fostering 
dissociation and by undermining the internal cohesion of groups, and breeding 
mistrust among members who saw many of their former comrades turn informants or 
dissociate. The success of the Italian state lies in these laws. Arrested members of 
armed groups knew that through collaboration or mere dissociation they could receive 
a reduced sentence, better prison conditions and have the prospect of returning to a 
normal life, and almost 400 of them did.  
 
 
 
Cover of Communist 
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South-East Asia 
This chapter will assess the disengagement policies pursued by South-East Asian 
states in countering violent non-state actors in the region as well as the factors 
reported by former terrorists as leading to disengagement. The essay will focus on 
Singapore and Indonesia, as unlike the Malaysian and Thai case the disengagement 
programs present more sources and research. Little information has been disclosed 
regarding Malaysia’s rehabilitation efforts (Rabasa 2011, p. 105)(Abuza 2009, p. 
206). However, human rights groups have reported beatings, torture and prolonged 
use of solitary confinement (Bon et al. 2005). Malaysia is difficult to assess, both 
because of the lack of transparency around its program and because it is impossible to 
assess if disengagement has been brought about by religious counseling or by 
coercion and torture. 
JI is a transnational Islamist Salafi organization founded in 1993 in Indonesia with 
roots in the Darul Islam islamist and anti-colonial movement (CEP 2016, p. 2). The 
group seeks to create an Islamic Caliphate under Sharia law in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore and parts of Thailand and the Philippines (ibid) and its ideology and tactics 
are outlined in the PUPJI manual (1996). The group has been affiliated to Al-Qaeda 
since its inception and more recently to ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, with many 
members fighting in Syria (Hwang & Ismail 2015). JI’s attacks have killed more than 
350 people between 2000 and 2009 with the largest attacks being the Bali bombings 
of 2002.  
As in many other cases there is not one single profile of a JI member (Abuza 2009, p. 
197); recruitment is often done through madrassas and is strongly based on kinship, 
which reduces the likelihood of infiltration and increases internal cohesion (ibid, p. 
196). Since 2001 more than 400 JI members have been arrested (Abuza 2009, p. 193); 
like in the case of the Red Brigades counterterrorism operations have forced JI to 
become a more horizontal organization with autonomous cells (ibid, p.197), so that 
the group can continue its activities even if top officials are arrested. 
As with other groups, Hwang notes that more work has been done on the process of 
radicalization than on disengagement (2015, p.2). To foster disengagement, Indonesia 
and Singapore use different forms of the theological dialogue model. The model is 
based on the one used since 2002 in Yemen (Abuza 2009, p. 197); however elements 
of the model adopted by Saudi Arabia, such as job training and support for the 
families of the detainees have also been used (ibid, p. 198).  
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The theological dialogue model involves showing detainees that they have 
misinterpreted sacred scriptures and have been applying the concept of Jihad in 
particular incorrectly. Detainees are then offered reduced sentences or amnesties in 
exchange for cooperation with authorities and abandonment of the armed struggle. 
The Singaporean Religious Rehabilitation Group holds that ‘religious counseling will 
assist the JI detainees to uncover misinterpretations and areas in which JI had gone 
wrong in its religious doctrine’ (Bin Ali ,p. 8); as a Singaporean official has stated: 
‘no one is born a terrorist… it’s indoctrination’ (Abuza 2009, p. 193). These 
programmes, according to Abuza, have three benefits: they discredit violent non-state 
actors and their justification for violence, they deter others from joining and they 
‘immunize muslim society’ (2009, p. 193).  
The paper will firstly look at Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country. The 
country was hit by a series of attacks between 2002 and 2005 with the two Bali 
bombings being the most serious attacks. Since then more than 300 JI members have 
been arrested and more cells and weapons have been discovered (Abuza 2009, p. 
198). While Indonesia lacks an institutionalized and coordinated programme like the 
one in Singapore authorities can claim some success in fostering disengagement. This 
is partly due to their unique approach of making former JI members a crucial part in 
the disengagement process (ibid).  
To assess the success of the Indonesian programme interviews conducted with 50 
jihadis by Hwang will be essential (2015). Hwang notes that while disengagement in 
Indonesia remains understudied her research found many of the drivers that foster 
disengagement in the Indonesian case were the same as they were in nationalist or 
political groups (2015, p. 5). The Indonesian programme rotates around Nasir Bin 
Abas, the former head of JI’s Mantiqi III. Nasir has provided the police with 
intelligence and assisted their operations, while also using his authority as a former 
senior member of JI to foster disengagement (Abuza 2009, p. 198).  
The former leader also exemplifies a very common pathway to disengagement. Mr. 
Abas firstly felt disillusionment with the group’s tactics, namely, with the killing of 
civilians in the Bali bombings, carried out by people he had previously trained; he 
believed the killing of civilians to be forbidden in his philosophy of jihad (Taylor 
2006). But his disengagement and cooperation didn’t come until he experienced 
another important factor in leading to disengagement, that is the humane treatment by 
authorities. Abas himself stated that the police treated him in a ‘very Islamic manner’ 
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(Abuza 2009, p. 198), he was not beaten or tortured but invited to pray with officials 
during interrogation; this undermined JI’s rhetoric that the Indonesian government 
was ‘murtad’, apostate and anti-muslim (ibid, p. 199).  
Disillusionment and humane treatment are connected, in what Hwang calls a 
reinforcement loop (2015, p. 11): in Abas’s case we see feelings of guilt and 
disillusionment with the group, which is reinforced by the undermining of JI’s 
rhetoric, thus further disillusionment with it, caused by his being treated with ‘civility 
and Muslim respect’ by authorities (Taylor 2006). 
 A similar pattern can be seen in many of Hwang’s interviewees, for example Arif, a 
JI member who fought in Afghanistan who is currently serving a life sentence in 
prison started feeling guilt after carrying out an attack on civilian Christians, however 
he continued to be an active member of the group. His disengagement came after his 
arrest, when the emotional response of guilt was reinforced by conversations with Ali 
Imron, with whom he had been in hiding and who is collaborating with the Indonesian 
government (2015, p. 12); these conversation lead to the rejection of violence not due 
to an emotional response but as a cost-benefit analysis.  
Furthermore Arif cites the former head of Densus 88, Indonesia’s antiterrorism unit, 
as someone who showed him a different way of being a good muslim, by helping the 
poor and the needy (ibid, p.13), as in Abas’s case this undermined JI’s rhetoric that 
the government was abusive towards muslims (Abuza 2009, p. 200). The surprise at 
humane treatment while in custody is a common trend in JI members (ibid) and those 
who cite it as a factor for disengagement do not only migrate to a non-violent role 
within the organization but leave it entirely, as shown in the graph below. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Hwang 2015, p.11) 
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The graph also shows the most common factors leading to disengagement. 
Disillusionment, with leaders or tactics, cost benefit analyses and new relationships 
are the factors reported most frequently, while shifts in personal priorities, parental 
pressure and humane treatment by authorities are also reported. These factors should 
not be taken independently; often an individual reports more than one of these factors, 
which, as we have seen, reinforce each other. These factors are very similar to the 
ones reported by Italian ‘terrorists’. 
Equally important in distancing disengaged individuals from the organization, and in 
undermining the group’s rhetoric of a government abusive towards Muslims is 
economic support to the families of detainees. The Indonesian police began providing 
economic aid to these families in 2006 (ibid). Economic aid is essential, as it allows 
families of detainees to not be reliant on JI’s social network to survive. When a new 
jihadi is arrested, the police assess their economic concerns and address them in order 
to earn the detainee’s gratitude, thus incentivizing cooperation. A senior Indonesian 
officer has stated in an interview with the International Crisis Group that this socio-
economic integration would be preferable to religious rehabilitation if one had to 
choose between the two (2007, p. 13). 
Disengagement efforts, however, are undermined by corruption and poor oversight of 
prisons. State corruption ‘reinforces the idea of state officials as anti-Islamic’ (ibid, p. 
i); while poor oversight leads jihadis to recruit ordinary criminals to their cause while 
incarcerated (ibid, p. 8). Furthermore short prison sentences and the Indonesian policy 
of general amnesties undermine the negotiating power officials have with detainees 
(Abuza 2009, p. 200). If the detainee knows his sentence will be short and reduced in 
an amnesty he is less likely to collaborate, as the officials can’t offer much in 
sentence reductions. While Indonesia’s scarce resources have made its economic 
support limited, its richer neighbor Singapore has much more vast resources at its 
disposal to foster disengagement. 
To this end, in 2003 the Singaporean government founded the Religious 
Rehabilitation Group, an association of religious scholars and teachers ‘who 
volunteer their services to counsel detainees to assist them in understanding their 
religion correctly’.2 It is important that Islamic scholars and leaders are involved both 
because it is crucial to empower moderate leaders and because as a country that does 
                                                        
2 http://rrg.sg/about-us 
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not have a majority of Muslim citizens, Singapore needs to do more to not appear 
anti-Islamic (Abuza 2009, p. 205).  
The RRG focuses on 4 key elements for ‘rehabilitation’: family support, which allows 
detainee’s families to visit and keep in contact, financial support to the spouse and 
children of JI members, and psychological and religious counseling3. Furthermore 
economic support is also provided in the form of aid in securing employment upon 
release (Abuza 2009, p. 205).  
The Singaporean government can claim a certain degree of success in its 
disengagement efforts. Of the 73 people detained until before 2008 44 (60%) had 
been released, though most of them still under restraining orders and undergoing 
religious counseling. The government stressed that the individuals released were 
‘cooperative and responded well to religious counseling’ (Abuza 2009, p. 203). The 
RRG has also extended counseling to detainees wives, as they ‘tend to be as 
indoctrinated as their husbands’ (ibid, p. 202). This is important since JI recruitment 
is heavily based on kinship as ‘kinship bonds make defection from JI difficult… 
defection is tantamount to betraying one’s own family’ (Noor 2007, p. 8).  
Singapore’s success in undoubtedly due to the vast resources, in finance and 
personnel devoted to its disengagement program. Furthermore most of the arrested 
had logistical roles in JI and had families and jobs (Abuza 2009, p. 203), therefore 
had more to lose from a prolonged detention. However there are problems with the 
program. Firstly, many detainees see the clerics as coopted by a kaffir (non-muslim) 
state, therefore not real Muslims (ibid, p. 205); secondly Singapore’s prosecution has 
relied on colonial era security acts, which allow for detention without trial: none of 
the detainees have been put on trial for involvement in JI (ibid, p. 206). 
Overall, Singapore’s program can be considered successful. It comprises ‘efforts to 
break a radical’s affective, pragmatic, and ideological commitment to an extremist 
group; continued support and monitoring after the individual completes the formal 
program; and the use of credible interlocutors to discredit radical Islamism’ (Rabasa 
2011, p. 103). Furthermore Singapore can claim a very low recidivism rate: only 1 of 
the released JI detainees has been rearrested (ibid, p. 104).  
In conclusion, though the authoritarian nature of some SouthEast-Asian regimes and 
the recentness of JI attacks entail less availability of data than in the Italian case some 
                                                        
3 RRG: Coping with the threat of Jemaah Islamiyah. Available at: 
http://rrg.sg/our-works/countering-extremism 
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lessons can be learnt from Singapore and Indonesia. Both use Islamic scripture and 
scholars to invalidate JI’s justifications for violence, however the program’s 
effectiveness is determined by different factors. Singapore’s success is due to a 
government led program with vast resources at its disposal in which psychologists 
work alongside religious leaders (Abuza 2009, p. 202). Alongside counseling 
detainees are aided in finding employment upon release and financial support is given 
to their families; economic support is essential in undermining the internal cohesion 
of groups like JI and in fostering disengagement. However, the exclusion of former 
combatants and the fact that clerics in the program are seen as coopted by a kuffir 
state undermine the effectiveness of the program. Indonesia seems to have opposite 
problems. The use of ex combatants and the fact that the program is not run by the 
government confer it legitimacy in the eyes of the detainees, however the absence of a 
government led program means the current one is underfunded and that little to no 
support can be given to detainees and their families.  
 
Analysis 
This paper has looked at factors conducive to disengagement for two groups 
which occupy very different geographical and temporal settings. As we have seen, PL 
and the BR were left wing groups active only in Italy between the ‘seventies and 
‘eighties which did not carry out attacks on civilians or large scale bombings; while 
JI, a group still active to date, is a transnational Islamist violent organization which 
has carried out mass bombings and killed civilians. 
 The paper has examined disengagement in both cases in two ways. Firstly, 
first hand accounts by former ‘terrorists’ concerning their reasons to abandon the 
armed struggle have been assessed; in particular the reasons reported as leading to the 
decision to disengage have been examined. Secondly, the paper has looked at how 
policies implemented by the states have affected the disengagement process. Though 
the groups, their aims, and the type of attacks carried out differ vastly the paper has 
shown how former combatants have reported very similar reasons to disengage.  
Both Italian and South-East Asian interviewees have reported humane 
treatment by authorities as a factor, while harsh prison conditions have been claimed 
to engender a confrontational and belligerent attitude. Even more frequently changes 
in personal priorities or relationships have also been reported both by left wing 
‘terrorists’ and Islamist ones; in particular the desire to start a family is often cited as 
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well as pressure to quit from parents or one’s partner. These reasons are often 
accompanied by a cost-benefit analysis, usually on the impossibility of victory against 
a much stronger state. However, the factors reported most frequently are 
disillusionment with leaders and tactics, in both cases we have seen how the 
escalation of violence represented by the Bali bombings, or the assassination of Aldo 
Moro or Guido Rossa has lead some to feel the armed struggle had ‘gone too far’ and 
that they therefore felt the need to distance themselves from it.  Overall, 
disillusionment with leaders and tactics, a change in personal priorities and humane 
treatment by authorities are the factors leading to disengagement most reported by 
‘terrorists’. 
The policies aimed at fostering disengagement implemented by the states analyzed 
show both commonalities and elements of difference; from which said states can gain 
invaluable insight. Both Singapore and Italy have programs for socio-economic 
reintegration, and religious figures who took part in the disengagement process. In 
Italy they acted as campaigners for better prison conditions, and were seen by some 
‘terrorists’ as intermediaries between them and the state. In Singapore clerics are used 
to counter ‘misunderstood theology’ in particular regarding the use of violence, and 
though they may be seen as co-opted by the regime their work is important in 
showing ‘terrorists’ a different interpretation of Jihad and of the Quran.  
Religious figures had different roles in the two countries but these examples show that 
they can be useful mediators. Furthermore the Italian example shows how religious 
figures can be effective intermediaries even when the groups do not have religious 
aims. In addition, both Italy and Indonesia show how former ‘terrorists’ such as Abas 
and Morucci can play an important role in the disengagement process both because of 
their previous roles as leading figures in the organizations and by providing a public 
example for those pondering disengagement.  
However, differences in disengagement policies are also present. While the success of 
the Italian state can be attributed to changes in the legal system very different factors 
have lead to success in South-East Asia. Indonesia and Singapore have used different 
version of the theological dialogue model, in which scripture is used to confute what 
is seen as misunderstood theology, however different factors contribute to the success 
of the programs. Indonesia can claim success as the use of former JI combatants to 
talk with inmates in the context of the absence of an official state lead program 
confers legitimacy in the eyes of the detainees. Furthermore economic support is 
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given to detainees and their families though the economic aspect is underfunded. 
Economic support is a key element of Singapore’s program, as support is provided to 
the families of detainees and training and aid in finding employment is provided to 
the detainees themselves. Singapore’s vast resources allow for more extensive 
economic support as well as religious as well as psychological counseling. While 
Italy’s success can be attributed to legal measures aimed at facilitating defection, 
Singapore and Indonesia owe their success to their focus on economic and social 
reintegration, and to the use of former combatants respectively. 
 
Conclusion & Policy Advice 
 This paper has attempted to assess if, in the context of disengagement, there is 
such a large difference between contemporary Islamic groups and their predecessors, 
that lessons learnt form the former would be inapplicable to the latter, as stated in 
much of the ‘new terrorism’ literature. The paper has found the contrary to be true. 
Both in the Italian and South-East Asian cases strong similarities can be found in both 
of the aspects assessed. 
Firstly, both the Islamist and Leftist ‘terrorists’ examined have reported similar 
factors as conducive to disengagement: disillusionment with leaders and tactics, 
changing priorities, and humane treatment were the factors cited most frequently. This 
implies that it is likely that policies aimed at targeting these factors would work in 
both cases. Reductions in prison sentences for example work for individuals from 
both groups, as a reduced sentence would facilitate the pursuit of a former terrorist’s 
new priorities, for example starting a family. 
Secondly, similarities have been found also in the policies implemented by the states, 
such as the use of former ‘terrorists’, reintegration programs and the use of clerics as 
intermediaries.  
The paper has shown how with regards to disengagement Islamic violent non-state 
actors are not substantially different from their predecessors: similar factors leading to 
it have been reported by former ‘terrorists’ and similar policies have worked both in 
Italy and South-East Asia. Evidence is not found that Islamic ‘terrorism’ is new and 
that new, stronger methods are needed to contrast it, at least in relation to 
disengagement. Lessons learnt from the past cannot therefore be deemed irrelevant 
and can in fact provide a blueprint for how to foster disengagement from Islamist 
organization.  
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How can these insights inform counter-terrorism strategies around the world? It has 
been estimated that foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria exceed 20000 with more than 
4000 coming from Europe 4. To deal with this threat many western countries have 
passed more stringent anti-terrorism legislation (Lister 2015, p. 8).  
The UK has passed legislation to facilitate the revocation and seizure of passports in 
the case of a threat to national security. These measures discourage disaffected 
foreign fighters from returning home and reduce the likelihood that family members 
would reach out to authorities for fear of incriminating their relatives (ibid, p. 5). 
There is a clear need for policies to foster disengagement, and address the factors 
conducive to it. As previously outlined, these factors include disillusionment with 
leaders and tactics, humane treatment and changing priorities or new relationships. 
Needless to say the countries of origin of these fighters need to arrest and prosecute 
any individual involved in any violent act or with any involvement in ‘terrorist’ 
activities. However there is also a need to reintegrate disengaged individuals into 
society. Countries with returning foreign fighters could learn from Singapore’s 
theological dialogue model: Islamic clerics from local mosques can be instrumental in 
refuting justifications for violence based on scripture and psychological counseling 
can aid both in rehabilitating those suffering violence-related disorders and in 
weeding out insincere candidates. Furthermore some returning foreign fighters may 
be already prone to disengage, or may have already disengaged due to disillusionment 
with unexpected violence or violence on other Muslims. These individuals require 
counseling and aid in social and economic reintegration as further marginalization 
may lead to re-engagement in violent activities.  
Professor Bertelsen of the University of Aarhus holds that upon returning home 
disengaged individuals often remain in contact with their still engaged peers, thus 
providing proof that it is possible to return home  (in Lister 2015, p. 9). The 
Indonesian case can provide an example of how disengaged individuals can be used to 
convince their peers to disengage. In addition, European states have a more 
substantial budget at their disposal than Indonesia to aid with economic and social 
                                                        
4 P.R. Neumann, (2015). “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 
20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” International 
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. 
Availble at: http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-
exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/. 
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reintegration; in fact a similar program to the South-East Asian ones can be found in 
Germany. 
The HAYAT5 network in Germany has a very similar approach to the one adopted by 
Singapore. Firstly, the jihadi narrative is delegitimized and, through counseling, the 
individual is encouraged to ‘come to terms with his past’ (Lister 2015, p. 10). 
Secondly, the individual is aided in finding employment, or training and housing. 
Finally, the individual is aided in establishing an alternative reference group and 
getting support from family members (ibid). Recently, a German IS member had his 
sentence halved in exchange for a full confession and intelligence on IS command 
structure 6. 
While this is a step in the right direction such an approach needs to be 
institutionalized so that others might provide information and disengage in exchange 
for a shorter sentence, as we have seen cost-benefit analyses play a crucial part in the 
disengagement process. Particularly in the case of individuals who have not 
committed acts of violence but joined Jihadi organizations in a support or logistical 
role there is a need for a framework that incentivizes these individuals to come 
forward and provide information to authorities. This needs to be done both through 
networks like HAYAT or the RRG and through legal tools to provide reduced 
sentences in exchange for disengagement and information. Due to their experience 
with ‘third wave terrorists’ some countries, such as Italy already have these tools in 
place and can share their experience with others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 http://hayat-deutschland.de/english/ 
6 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/15/german-isis-suspect-
shorter-jail-term-information. 
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